A review of Elizabeth Wilson’s Affect and Artificial Intelligence by Manh-Tung, Ho
A review of Elizabeth Wilson’s Affect and Artificial Intelligence 
 
Ho Manh Tung 
Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University 
Beppu, Oita, Japan 
November 1, 2020 
 
In Affect and Artificial Intelligence, Elizabeth A. Wilson analyzes “the early affective networks 
within which mid-twentieths-century computational devices were anticipated and built” and 
argues that emotion lies that the foundation of building smart machines. She also seeks to make 
the computational objects more engaging for humanities scholars by studying the affective 
components (curiosity, contempt, anger, sadness, etc.) of the works of the three brilliant early 
computer scientists and mathematicians, Alan Turing (1912-1954), Walter Pitts (1912-1969), 
and Joseph Weizenbaum (1923-2008), in developing their respective machines.  
Krzywoszynska (2012) succinctly points out that the most interesting argument in the 
book is how AI, as a concept, becomes constructed in an emotionless and impassive way. Indeed, 
very early on in the book, Wilson provides a juxtaposition of two models of thinking about AI by 
quoting from Alan Turing’s famous Computational Machinery and Intelligence paper (1950): 
the chess-playing model and the child-like model. Through numerous biographical examples, 
Wilson convincingly argues that most commentaries about AI are dominated by the chess-
playing model, which is all about abstraction, number-crunching, and symbols-manipulation. 
And this is the result of our reluctance to admit the role of emotion in smart machines’ life.  
There are two problems pointed out by the Stahnisch (2011) and Krzywoszynska (2012). 
First, Wilson’s (2010) book suffers the most from the lack of a concluding remark. And second, 
Krzywoszynska (2012) and Stanisch (2011) point out that Wilson’s (2010) book is lightly 
referenced, and its sheer brevity does not match the formidable size of its topic. I agree with 
these points but add three points that I think can make the argument stronger in the book.  
First, it is a glaring missed opportunity that Wilson did not engage with the literature on 
affective computing given Rosalind Picard had invented the field since the late 1990s (Picard, 
2000). This field aims to teach a machine the ability to read, track, classify, and even express 
human emotions. Perhaps, it is the most direct attempt to endowing the “ability to feel” to a 
machine. By 2003, this field achieved the accuracy rate of recognizing the so-called eight basic 
emotions postulated by Ekman (1999) of 81% (Picard, 2003). In recent years, companies that sell 
AI products based on this approach claim a 95% accuracy rate in recognizing emotion. However, 
this is very much up for debate, given the rise of new theories and empirical results in emotion 
study (Heaven, 2020).  
Based on Wilson’s arguments in the book, I think she would argue even for affective 
computing, the assumption of the eventual success of the brute-force calculation approach on top 
of big data is too strong. This way of thinking is often called “behaviorism,” “the doctrine that 
psychology can only, and should only be, the science of behavior, not of minds; that it can only 
measure and predict relationships between people’s external circumstances (‘stimuli’) and their 
observed behaviors (‘responses’)” (Deustch, 2011, pp.157-158).  
I believe different theories of emotions, i.e., different modes of explaining how emotions 
are formed, expressed, and inferred, will have different implications for improving the current 
machine learning approaches to emotions. The current behaviorist approach might have certain 
successes with the explosion of big data and computational power, yet, it is prone to the 
algorithmic designers as well as biases in the data. Two examples come to mind. Several recent 
studies on the accuracy of reading emotions of different races expose that current machine 
algorithms are more likely to ascribe that black people are angrier (McStay, 2018; Rhue, 2019). 
And in cases where the initial dataset is dominated by one sex, such as among the police force, 
using the current AI approach to track emotions of female police officers might lead to 
dangerous errors (Purdy, Zealley, & Maseli, 2019).  
Another issue I wish Wilson explores is the acculturation of emotion and affect, i.e., how 
people learn and unlearn their emotional reaction and how that might influence AI developers. 
Wilson might have successfully conveyed that all of the pioneers of AI think we need to 
understand emotion better to build smart AI, or there are ways in which emotions have leaky 
effects in their works. Yet, the book never brought up the issue of changing emotions. This is an 
important issue as our emotional lives are being disrupted drastically with social media’s 
hyperconnectivity. The emergence of so many subcultures and ideologies consequently gives rise 
to new modes of emoting. This issue of acculturation (Vuong et al., 2018a; Vuong et al., 2020; 
Vuong & Napier, 2015) will keep coming up, and the current behaviorist approach in AI about 
emotions is inadequate to explain the ebbs and flows of our emotional lives as well as telling us 
what the appropriate emotions to feel in certain situations are. 
Finally, it seems that the book’s biographical historical data could benefit from a more 
methodological approach to organizing the data. The book talks about emotion and affects in 
general, but it could have categorized emotions better. There are reactive emotions (anger, 
disgust, joy) and meta-cognitive ones (doubt, curiosity, wonder, awe). The meta-cognitive 
emotions help us evaluate our normal emotional responses to situations in life. In other words, it 
helps us take a step back and put our emotional lives in a grander perspective.  
Or there can be three levels of analysis: emotions and affects, intuition, and reason, in 
which intuition provides a bridge from emotion to reason. Our intuition is a set of basic core 
values, axioms, or rule of thumb, that guides our behavior, emotion, and cognition. Our intuition 
can be updated and changed with learning. Once it is changed, we might have a different set of 
emotional responses than our original one. For example, once we learn how to fight, a certain 
way of standing starts to feel unnatural and dangerous. In Wilson’s book, the affective aspects of 
the three AI pioneers can be analyzed in terms of how they come to have certain intuitions about 
a machine that can think and feel. This is also an angle where the perspective of acculturation of 
emotions can have a role to play.   
These two examples of how biographical data about emotions can bring about a more 
systematic analysis (Vuong et al., 2018b) of the emotional landscapes of the AI pioneers and 
how they affect their work. Besides, an orderly organization of data could help shape the 
narrative arcs of Wilson’s book as well as general concluding remark too. Beyond the book, I 
think it can even help to improve the replicability in humanities (Peels & Bouter, 2018; Vuong, 
2020). 
Despite such shortcomings, I think Wilson’s book is of great interest to readers of the 
biographical history of computer science and, more importantly, humanities scholars who would 
like to explore how emotions influence the works of early pioneers amongst AI theoreticians and 
engineers. 
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